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MARITIME LAW-AMERICAN DREDGING COMPANY V. MILLER'. 
THE SUPREME COURT LEAVES THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
DEBATE UNRESOLVED 
INTRODUCTION 
When the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari, 
judges and practitioners hope that the resulting decision will resolve 
a controversial issue in a definitive manner. That hope was left un­
fulfilled in American Dredging Co. v. Miller.1 The Court in that 
case failed to resolve the issue of whether federal procedural law or 
state procedural law should determine the applicability of the doc­
trine of forum non conveniens in maritime cases brought in state 
courts pursuant to the "saving to suitors" clause of maritime law.2 
Seaman William R. Miller brought a personal injury claim in a 
Louisiana state court, the Civil District Court for the Parish of Or­
leans.3 The state court held, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap­
peal of Louisiana affirmed, that the state had no connection to the 
case for the following reasons: (1) the plaintiff was a Mississippi 
resident, (2) the defendant was a Pennsylvania corporation with its 
principal place of business in New Jersey, (3) the accident occurred 
on the Delaware River, on the defendant's ship, which had never 
been in Louisiana waters, and (4) the plaintiff was treated for his 
injuries in Pennsylvania, New York, and Mississippi.4 The trial 
court granted, and the appeal court affirmed the defendant's mo­
1. 510 U.S. 443 (1994). 
2. The saving to suitors clause provides: "The district courts shaU have original 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or 
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in aU cases aU other remedies to which they are 
otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.c. § 1333(1) (1994). The original wording of this portion of 
the statute in the Judiciary Act of 1789 was "saving to suitors, in aU cases, the right of a 
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The current wording is clearer, simpler, and 
conforms with the abolition of the distinction between law and equity in American 
courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333, Reviser's Note (1994). The "saving to suitors" phrase 
means reserving or insuring that litigants are able to bring a lawsuit in state court for a 
remedy that a state court is legaUy able to provide. 
3. See Miller v. American Dredging Co., 580 So. 2d 1091, 1091 (La. Ct. App. 
1991). 
4. See Respondent's Brief at *57A, American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 
443 (1994) (No. 89-25877), available in 1993 WL 409368 Joint Appendix, "Court of 
Appeal, Fourth Circuit, State of Louisiana." 
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tion to dismiss the case based on forum non conveniens because the 
plaintiff was able to file his case in another forum that was more 
appropriate-Pennsylvania.s The Supreme Court of Louisiana re­
versed the court of appeal's decision and denied the dismissal, con­
cluding that forum non conveniens was not a substantive feature of 
maritime law and thus the doctrine could be preempted by the rule 
of Louisiana civil procedure which prohibits the application of the 
doctrine in the Jones Act6 or maritime cases? The United States 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana, concluding that forum non conveniens was not charac­
teristic of maritime law, nor did Louisiana's refusal to apply the 
doctrine cause any harm to the uniformity and harmony of mari­
time law.s 
In its decision, the United States Supreme Court held that 
there was no need for forum non conveniens to be uniformly ap­
plied in maritime cases in state and federal courts, since the doc­
trine is only a matter of "judicial housekeeping" for federal courts.9 
Thus, when a maritime case is brought in state court, the federal 
rule may be preempted by a conflicting state law. In the Miller 
case, Louisiana civil procedure disallowed the use of the forum non 
conveniens defense in Jones ActlO or maritime cases brought in 
state court, contrary to federal procedure which allows the de­
fense.!1 The Supreme Court held that the state of Louisiana had 
5. See Miller, 580 So. 2d at 1092. 
6. See infra note 27 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Jones Act. 
7. See Miller v. American Dredging Co., 595 So. 2d 615,619 (La. 1992). 
8. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 u.S. 443, 457 (1994). 
9. Id. 
10. See infra note 27 and accompanying text for the details of the Jones Act. 
11. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 123 B, C (West Supp. 1996). Paragraphs B 
and C of Article 123 provide: 
B. Except as provided in Paragraph C, upon the contradictory motion of 
any defendant in a civil case filed in a district court of this state in which a 
claim or cause of action is predicated solely upon a federal statute and is based 
upon acts or omissions originating outside of this state, when it is shown that 
there exists a more appropriate forum outside of this state, taking into account 
the location where the acts giving rise to the action occurred, the convenience 
of the parties and witnesses, and the interest of justice, the court may dismiss 
the suit without prejudice; however, no suit in which the plaintiff is domiciled 
in this state, and which is brought in a court which is otherwise a court of 
competent jurisdiction and proper venue, shall be dismissed pursuant to this 
Article. In the interest of justice, and before the rendition of the judgment of 
dismissal, the court shall require the defendant or defendants to file with the 
court a waiver of any defense based upon prescription, provided that a suit on 
the same cause of action is commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction 
within sixty days from the rendition of the judgment of dismissal. 
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the right to apply its local procedural rule despite the apparent con­
flict with federallaw,12 In their dissent in Miller, Justices Kennedy 
and Thomas argued that the majority's holding defeated two pur­
poses of admiralty law: the uniformity of maritime law among states 
and the elimination of forum shopping,13 Because the majority 
viewed forum non conveniens as a procedural rule of federal mari­
time law that is applied in federal courts, the Miller Court held that 
a state court could deny the use of forum non conveniens.14 
Although the dissent also recognized forum non conveniens as a 
procedural rule, it argued that uniformity in maritime procedures 
among all the states is more important than permitting a few states 
to prohibit the application of the rule in their state courts. The dis­
sent therefore concluded that the rule should be available to any 
defendant in a maritime case, regardless of whether the case is 
brought in a state court that does not recognize the doctrine.15 
Section I of this Note describes the history of maritime and 
admiralty law, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and the rule 
of Louisiana civil procedure that preempts the application of the 
doctrine in maritime cases brought in state court. Section II focuses 
on the principal case of American Dredging Co. v. Miller. This sec­
tion follows the case from its beginning in the civil district court, 
through the Court of Appeal of Louisiana and the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, to its conclusion in the United States Supreme 
Court. Section III analyzes the principal case and related case law. 
This Note proposes that the doctrine of forum non conveniens, far 
from being merely a procedural rule that is only fit for federal court 
housekeeping, is an essential part of maritime law that should not 
be preempted by a conflicting state procedural rule. In conclusion, 
this Note urges that the forum non conveniens doctrine should be 
available uniformly in every maritime case, whether brought in fed­
eral or state court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Admiralty and Maritime Law 
The United States Constitution grants federal judicial power 
C. The provisions of Paragraph B shall not apply to claims brought pur­
suant to 46 USC [sic] § 688 or federal maritime law. 
Id. 
12. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 456. 
13. See id. at 462 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
14. See id. at 453-54. 
15. See id. at 467-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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over all admiralty and maritime cases.16 Recognition of the need 
for federal jurisdiction over maritime cases preceded the Constitu­
tion. Thus, Alexander Hamilton observed that even those persons 
who most strongly supported states' rights accepted the propriety of 
the national courts adjudicating maritime causes,17 The chief rea­
son for this accommodation by states' rights proponents was that 
maritime cases often involved foreign nations.1s In establishing a 
special body of law pertaining to maritime activity, Americans were 
following the jurisprudential paradigm of nations worldwide that 
recognized maritime law as a distinct body of law,19 
The Constitution vested power over admiralty cases in United 
States courtS.20 The jurisdiction of federal courts, however, was not 
exclusive. Congress granted a maritime plaintiff the right to seek in 
state court any common law remedy that a state court is legally 
competent to provide. This right is the "saving to suitors" clause 
that originated in the Judiciary Act of 1789.21 Thus, Congress 
granted concurrent jurisdiction to the states to provide remedies to 
16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power [of the United States] 
shall extend ... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Id. 
The American colonies used the English system of separate admiralty courts until, 
under the Articles of Confederation, the United States adopted a system of state admi­
ralty courts. See 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 1-6, 
at 17-18 (Practitioner Treatise Series, 2d ed. 1994). This system of separate and often 
conflicting laws caused the drafters of the Constitution to create a national admiralty 
system. See 1 id. at 18. 
17. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a dispo­
sition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes. These 
so generally depend on the laws of nations and so commonly affect the rights 
of foreigners that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the 
public peace. 
Id. 
18. See id. 
19. See 1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 16, § I-I, at 3. Maritime law took definite 
form as early as the Code of Hammurabi, around 1800 B.C. See 1 id. § 1-2, at 3. The 
word "maritime" comes from the Latin "mare," meaning sea, and means "of the sea." 
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1101 (2d ed. 1968). The word 
"admiralty" comes from the Arabic word meaning "ruler of' and is the law dealing with 
cases arising on the high seas. Id. at 25. "Maritime" encompassed a broader scope than 
"admiralty" since the latter referred to a specialized English medieval court. See 1 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 16, § I-I, at 1. Today, the terms "maritime" and "admiralty" 
are used interchangeably. See id; see also GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., 
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § I-I, at 1 & n.l (2d ed. 1975). 
20. See supra note 16 for the wording of the Constitutional grant of power. 
21. See supra note 2 for the texts of the original clause and of the current version 
as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994). 
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maritime litigants in whatever cases state courts were competent to 
do so. 
State courts are competent to adjudicate maritime actions in 
personam, where the defendant is a person.22 Thus, a plaintiff may 
bring a maritime action in personam in either a federal court under 
maritime law or in a state court under the "saving to suitors" 
clause.23 Regardless of whether the action is brought in federal or 
state court, the substantive law applied in the case is federal mari­
time law, consisting of federal statutes, and federal and state judges' 
decisions.24 
On the other hand, state courts are not competent and may not 
adjudicate a maritime action in rem because such a cause of action 
was unknown to the common law.25 Admiralty has exclusive juris­
diction over proceedings in rem, "that is, where a vessel or thing is 
itself treated as the offender and made the defendant by name or 
description."26 
In the case of personal injuries suffered by an employed sea­
man, however, a state court has concurrent jurisdiction with a fed­
eral court over such an in personam maritime case. This expanded 
protection of seamen was codified by the Merchant Marine Act of 
1920, popularly known as the Jones ActP Thus, seamen can sue 
22. See Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560-61 (1954); see also 1 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 16, § 4-1 to 4-2, at 134-35. 
23. See 1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 16, § 4-1 to 4-2, at 134-35. 
24. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 1-2, at 9 
(Hornbook Series, 2d ed. 1994). 
25. See id. § 1-2, at 7. 
26. Madruga, 346 U.S. at 560. 
27. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, § 33,41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified 
at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1994». The applicable text of the Jones Act is: 
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment 
may ... maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, 
and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the 
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees 
shall apply . . . . Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the 
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office 
is located. 
Id. 
The commentary following the text indicates that the statutes referred to are prob­
ably the Employers' Liability Acts, codified in the Railroads section of the United 
States Code. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). In particular, section 56 of TItle 45 speci­
fies where an action may be brought and the jurisdiction of the court: 
Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the 
United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the 
cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the 
time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
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for personal injury under the Jones Act under either admiralty law 
in state or federal court, or at law in state court.28 
Since 1966, the procedural rules used in admiralty cases 
brought in federal court have been the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure.29 Actions brought in state court are usually subject to state 
procedural rules. Thus, the question arises as to whether federal 
procedures must be used in a maritime case brought in state court. 
B. History of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens30 was adopted by the 
States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the 
several states. 
45 V.S.c. § 56 (1994). 
28. The chief advantage of a suit at law is the right to a trial by jury, which is not 
available in admiralty. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 19, § 1-10, at 24 n.79. A 
seaman could sue for personal injury under the Jones Act "either at law or in admiralty, 
and he usually picks the former, for he wants to present his case to the jury." Id. 
As noted by one commentator, a case brought in state court under the "saving to 
suitors" clause of 28 V.S.c. § 1333 "has been labelled 'reverse-Erie' because it gives the 
plaintiff the best of both worlds: federal substantive law and state procedures (most 
importantly, a jury trial)." Paula K. Speck, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law 
in Admiralty: Time for an Overhaul, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 185, 199 (1987). 
29. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 24, § 1-2, at 9. 
30. The doctrine dates back to Scottish estate cases and those involving busi­
nesses owned by foreign-domiciled partners. See Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum 
Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1,29 (1929). 
[I]n Scotland the types of cases where the plea of forum non conveniens has 
been most frequently sustained are (a) suits where foreign executors are being 
called upon to account to a court other than that of their appointment; and (b) 
suits where the court is asked to settle the accounts of a partnership where the 
business was carried on abroad and neither partner is domiciled in the 
jurisdiction. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
Blair mentioned an appeal from the Scottish Court of Sessions that was decided in 
the English House of Lords in 1926, namely La Societe du Gaz de Paris v. La Societe 
Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais" where a French ship owner was 
sued by a French shipper for damaged cargo, having obtained jurisdiction over the 
owner by attaching his property while it was in Scotland. The owner's forum non con­
veniens claim was finally granted in the appeal to the House of Lords, where Lord Shaw 
said: 
If in the whole circumstances of the case it be discovered that there is a real 
unfairness to one of the suitors in permitting the choice of a forum which is 
not the natural or proper forum, either on the ground of convenience of trial 
or the residence or domicile of parties, or of its being either the locus contrac­
tus, or the locus solutionis, then the doctrine of forum non conveniens is prop­
erly applied. 
Blair, supra, at 20 (quoting La Societe du Gaz de Paris v. La Societe Anonyme de 
Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais," 1925 Sess. Cas. 332,345, affd, 1926 Sess. Cas. 
(H.L.) 13). . 
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American states at common law.31 The doctrine is alternately 
called "inconvenient forum," and is defined as the "discretionary 
power of [the] court to decline jurisdiction when [the] convenience 
of parties and ends of justice would be better served if [the] action 
were brought and tried in another forum. "32 
In the United States, the constitutional grant of federal judicial 
power over maritime cases clearly gave federal courts the ability to 
adjudicate maritime cases between foreigners or between a for­
eigner and a United States citizen.33 Such was the situation in the 
1804 case of Mason v. The Ship Blaireau.34 Chief Justice Marshall, 
after hearing doubts expressed as to the propriety of an American 
court's jurisdiction in a case between two foreigners, .pointed out 
that jurisdiction should be evaluated in terms of public convenience 
factors.35 This supported the Court's decision to deny a.forum non 
conveniens dismissal and hear the case.36 Thus, while the Court 
was not obligated to hear the case, it made a discretionary decision 
to do so. 
Courts also had the discretionary right to refuse to handle 
cases, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens if there was a 
more appropriate forum available to the litigants, as happened in 
the case of The Maggie Hammond.37 In that case, the Supreme 
Court focused on the pivotal role of a court in deciding to dismiss a 
case in the interests of justice to the parties.38 
31. See Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv. 908 
(1947). Braucher noted in his description of the history of forum non conveniens that: 
[A]t least as early as 1817 a [New York] state court asserted and exercised a 
discretionary power to deny its facilities to a cause as to which it had jurisdic­
tion, and such a power has often been asserted in actions between aliens, non­
residents, and foreign corporations and in suits involving the 'internal affairs' 
of foreign corporations. It is these cases which must be relied on as establish­
ing the doctrine of forum non conveniens in American law. 
Id. at 914 (footnotes omitted). 
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990). 
33. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, d. 1. 
34. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804). 
35. See id. at 264. 
36. See id. 
37. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 435 (1869). 
38. See id. at 457. A British company, Morland & Co., sued, in an American 
court, a British ship owned by a British subject living in Nova Scotia, regarding the 
enforcement of a maritime lien for a breach of contract for merchandise not delivered. 
In the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the circuit court's decision to enforce the lien 
and deny a forum non conveniens removal, Justice Clifford stated that, in the United 
States, 
it seems to be settled that our admiralty courts have full jurisdiction over suits 
between foreigners, if the subject-matter of the controversy is of a maritime 
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In the early years of the United States, the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens allowed federal and state courts the option to hear 
a case or to dismiss it to a more convenient forum that would accept 
the case.39 In theo1947 non-admiralty case Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil­
bert,40 Justice Jackson enumerated some of the factors to be consid­
ered when applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
including: advantages and obstacles to a fair trial, respect for the 
plaintiff's choice of forum so long as it does not harass the defend­
ant, access to proof, availability of witnesses, access to the site of 
the action of the case, enforceability of the judgment, congestion of 
the courts, burden of jury duty, and appropriateness of having the 
trial in a state whose law governs the case.41 
Until 1948, whenever a state or federal court determined that a 
case should be adjudicated in an alternative forum, the case was 
dismissed under forum non conveniens. In 1948, Congress 
amended the United States Code to include a provision allowing 
federal district courts to transfer civil cases to another district court 
where the action could have originally been brought, in the interest 
of justice and for the convenience of the parties.42 The statute, 
"drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
... was intended to be a revision rather than a codification of the 
common law."43 In fact, section 1404(a) allows federal courts wider 
"discretion to transfer ... than they had to dismiss on grounds of 
nature, but the question is one of discretion in every case, and the court will 
not take cognizance of the case if justice would be as well done by remitting 
the parties to their home forum. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
Nearly two decades later, the Supreme Court confirmed that, even though an 
American court might have proper jurisdiction over foreign litigants despite the fact 
that the controversy had not arisen within the United States, "from motives of conven­
ience or international comity, [the court] will use its discretion whether to exercise juris­
diction or not." The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355,363-64 (1885). 
39. See Cicek Zoroglu, Case Comment, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 516, 
519 (1994). 
40. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
41. See id. at 508-09. Justice Jackson enumerated the factors to be considered in a 
forum non conveniens inquiry, noting that "[a]n interest to be considered, and the one 
likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. . . . But unless the 
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should 
rarely be disturbed." Id. at 508. 
42. See 28 U.S.c. § 1404(a) (1994). In the federal system, a case can be trans­
ferred from one federal court to another using this section, which states: "For the con­
venience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer 
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Id. 
43. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981) (citations omitted). 
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forum non conveniens."44 Thus, under section 1404(a), if the fed­
eral forum is held to be inconvenient, a diversity case need not be 
dismissed but can be transferred to another federal district court, 
carrying with it the law of the original court.45 The "housekeeping 
measure" of transfer allows the federal system to operate more 
justly and efficiently.46 
Forum non conveniens, on the other hand, does not involve the 
transfer of a case, but rather, the dismissal of a case in one jurisdic­
tion subject to the case being tried in an alternative jurisdiction. 
However, if the alternative forum's remedy is "so clearly inade­
quate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, ... the district 
court may conclude that dismissal [on the grounds of forum non 
conveniens] would not be in the interests of justice."47 
When a litigant brings a Jones Act or maritime suit in federal 
court, federal substantive admiralty law and federal procedures are 
applied.48 When a litigant brings a Jones Act or maritime suit in a 
state court, federal substantive maritime law is applied. However, 
the issue arises, as it did in the Miller case, whether federal or state 
procedural law should be applied in such cases.49 Lacking any con­
gressionallegislation on the application of forum non conveniens in 
Jones Act or maritime cases brought in state court, the Supreme 
44. Id. 
45. See Paul S. Edelman, Forum Non Conveniens: Its Application in Admiralty 
Law, 15 J. MAR. L. & COM. 517, 517 (1984). This is distinguishable from a case of 
federal question jurisdiction, where the court applies the same federal law in every fed­
eral court. 
46. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254. In an article on the due process limitations on 
nationwide service of process, Professor Robert Lusardi noted that both transfer and 
forum non conveniens provide some protection for defendants. See Robert A. Lusardi, 
Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 
33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 34 n.l58 (1988). In addition, he noted that both doctrines "were 
intended to limit a jurisdictional system which focused on physical power over the de­
fendant, rather than intended as methods of finding a fair forum for the litigation." Id. 
at 37. He concluded that the constitutional rights of the defendant should not be tram­
pled by the plaintiff's ability to force a court to exert jurisdiction over the defendant 
based on the slightest of connections with the forum, but rather the interests of all 
should be balanced. See id. at 40-48. 
47. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254. 
48. See, e.g., id. at 235. In Piper, representatives of Scottish decedents killed in 
Scotland brought a wrongful death action against American manufacturers of the air­
plane. The case was dismissed under forum non conveniens under the presumption that 
the action could be brought in Scotland, which was thought to be a more convenient 
forum, despite the fact that the substantive law in the alternative forum, Scotland, might 
be less favorable to the plaintiffs. The Court held that the application of the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens may not be prohibited because the alternative forum offers less 
advantageous law. See id. at 250. 
49. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994). 
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Court over the years has developed its own interpretation. Simi­
larly, states adjudicating Jones Act and maritime cases have some­
times set up their own rules regarding the application of forum non 
conveniens, such as Louisiana did in enacting Article 123 of its code 
of civil procedure.50 
C. History of Louisiana Civil Procedure Article 123 
In the state of Louisiana, the Louisiana rules of civil procedure 
control the applicability of forum non conveniens. Article 122 of 
those rules is the sole article that 'deals with change of venue.51 
Under Article 122 a change is allowed only if a litigant proves that 
the trial would be unfair or prejudicial "or some other sufficient 
cause."52 In the 1967 case Trahan v. Phoenix Insurance Co. ,53 the 
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal rejected the lower court's 
reasoning that the last phrase of the venue statute-"or some other 
sufficient cause"-was meant to allow the addition of forum non 
conveniens to the list of reasons for a change of venue.54 On the 
contrary, the Court of Appeal held that forum non conveniens was 
"foreign" to Louisiana law, and not allowed. 55 As a result of the 
court's decision, the Louisiana State Law Institute recommended a 
new provision. The Louisiana legislature passed this new provision 
in 1970 as Article 123.56 Article 123 deals with forum non con­
veniens, specifying the situations in which it can be applied by the 
court at its discretion in the interest of justice.57 However, the last 
paragraph of the Article, paragraph C, forbids the application of 
forum non conveniens to any Jones Act or maritime claim.58 
50. See supra note 11 for the text of Article 123. 
51. See LA. CODE elV. PRoe. ANN. art. 122 (West 1960). Article 122 states in 
full: 
Any party by contradictory motion may obtain a change of venue upon 
proof that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial because of the undue 
influence of an adverse party, prejudice existing in the public mind, or some 
other sufficient cause. If the motion is granted, the action shall be transferred 
to a parish wherein no party is domiciled. 
Id. 
52. Id. 
53. 200 So. 2d 118 (La. Ct. App. 1967), superseded by statute, LA. CODE CIv. 
PRoe. ANN. art. 123 (West Supp. 1996). 
54. Id. at 121. 
55. Id. at 122. The court held "that the doctrine of 'forum non conveniens' is 
foreign to our jurisprudence and contrary to express legislative declaration .... [It is] 
repugnant to the express statutory law of this state." Id. 
56. See supra note 11 for the relevant text of Article 123. 
57. See supra note 11. 
58. See supra note 11. 
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The application of the new statute by Louisiana state courts 
established Louisiana as an "open forum" state for maritime claims, 
since no such claim would be dismissed from Louisiana state courts 
for forum non conveniens.59 Any doubt as to the interpretation of 
Article 123 was clarified by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in 
Markzannes v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc. 60 In Markzannes, the court 
held that Article 123 C prohibited the application of forum non 
conveniens to all causes of action arising under the Jones Act or 
maritime law.61 Further, while Article 123 B allowed dismissal of a 
case based on a federal statute and occurring outside Louisiana on 
forum non conveniens grounds, "Louisiana courts may apply Loui­
siana procedural law in causes of action brought in Louisiana 
courts."62 
The large maritime l;>ar in the state of Louisiana, with its histor­
ical and contemporary maritime ties and interests, handles signifi­
cant numbers of Jones Act and maritime claims on a regular basis.63 
Thus, it is not surprising that a Louisiana case, American Dredging 
Co. v. Miller,64 raised the question of whether federal forum non 
conveniens law could preempt conflicting state forum non con­
veniens law. 
II. AMERICAN DREDGING Co. V. MILLER 
Seaman William R. Miller, a Mississippi resident, was em­
ployed by American Dredging Company ("American Dredging"), a 
59. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Lavergne v. Western Co. of North America, 
371 So. 2d 807 (La. 1979), attempted to clarify Article 123 by holding that a state court 
could impose a restriction on the application of forum non conveniens so long as such a 
prohibition did not modify a characteristic feature of maritime law. The court stated 
that 
a state court, having concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts as to in 
personam admiralty claims, is free to adopt such remedies and attach to them 
such incidents as it sees fit so long as it does not attempt to modify or displace 
essential features of the substantive maritime law. 
Id. at 810. 
Several years later, the Louisiana Supreme Court abandoned any pretense that 
forum non conveniens could be prohibited in maritime cases only if the failure to apply 
the doctrine did not affect a characteristic feature of maritime law and held that forum 
non conveniens was prohibited in any maritime or Jones Act case. See Markzannes v. 
Bermuda Star Line, Inc., 545 So. 2d 537, 537 (La. 1989). 
60. 545 So. 2d 537 (La. 1989) (per curiam). 
61. See id. at 537. 
62. Id. 
63. See Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Wagner, Attorney of Record for 
American Dredging Company (Jan. 27, 1995). 
64. 510 U.S. 443 (1994). 
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Pennsylvania company with its principal place of business in New 
Jersey.65 In December 1987, Miller was injured while working on 
American Dredging's tugboat "John R.," which was operating in 
the Delaware River.66 He was treated at facilities in Pennsylvania, 
New York, and then in various locations in Mississippi, upon his 
return to his native state in February 1988.67 As an injured seaman, 
Miller filed an action in a Louisiana state court against American 
Dredging under the Jones Act,68 pursuant to the "saving to suitors" 
clause of maritime law.69 
A. Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans 
Miller filed his complaint with the Civil District Court for the 
Parish of Orleans on December 1, 1989, claiming injuries sustained 
while working on the tug "John R." in the employ of defendant 
American DredgingJo American Dredging's registered agent in 
Louisiana received service of process.71 Thereafter, American 
Dredging filed exceptions for lack of in personam jurisdiction72 by 
the court and forum non conveniens,73 claiming that the agent was 
maintained in Louisiana simply in order to enable the company to 
bid on dredging projects in Louisiana and that the company had no 
property or bank accounts in the state.74 
Miller argued that the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in 
Markzannes v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc. 75 upheld the state civil pro­
cedure law disallowing the application of forum non conveniens in 
65. See id. at 445. 
66. See Miller v. American Dredging Co., 580 So. 2d 1091, 1091-92 (La. Ct. App. 
1991), rev'd, 595 So. 2d 615 (La. 1992), affd, 510 U.S. 443 (1994). 
67. See Miller, 595 So. 2d at 616. 
68. See supra note 27 for the text of the Jones Act. 
69. See supra note 2 for the text of 28 U.S.c. § 1333(1) (1994). The "saving to 
suitors" clause reserves to a litigant the right to sue in state court for any remedy that 
can be given by the common law as it is applied in state court. See id. 
70. See Respondent's Brief at *7A, American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 
443 (1994) (No. 89-25877), available in 1993 WL 409368. 
71. See id. at *2. 
72. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for an explanation of in personam 
jurisdiction. 
The court denied American Dredging's claim that Louisiana could exert no long­
arm jurisdiction over American Dredging. See Respondent's Brief at *49A, Miller (No. 
89-25877). Instead, the court held that Louisiana did have proper in personam jurisdic­
tion over American Dredging. See id. 
73. See supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text for an explanation and history 
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
74. See Respondent's Brief at *13A, Miller (No. 89-25877). 
75. 545 So. 2d 537, 537 (La. 1989). 
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Jones Act or maritime law cases.76 American Dredging argued that 
forum non conveniens is part of general maritime law and both dis­
courages forum shopping by plaintiffs and fosters uniformity in 
maritime law.77 American Dredging urged the court to follow the 
Louisiana Supreme Court's rejection of any modification or dis­
placement of maritime law by state courts as stated in Lavergne v. 
Western Co. of North America.78 American Dredging also re­
quested that the court repudiate as erroneous the "open forum" 
policy stated in Kassapas v. Arkon Shipping Agency, Inc. 79 and 
Markzannes v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc. ,80 which prohibited dismis­
sal of maritime cases from Louisiana courts under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens. The civil district court granted the forum 
non conveniens exception and dismissed the case, "[s]ubject to the 
right of plaintiff to pursue this claim in a court of competent juris­
diction in Pennsylvania. "81 
B. Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit 
Miller appealed the grant of forum non conveniens and dismis­
sal of the suit. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana affirmed the trial 
court's judgment.82 In its discussion, the court described the doc­
trine as "a characteristic feature of the general maritime law,"83 and 
cited federal decisions that support the application of federal forum 
76. See id. See supra note 11 for the relevant text of article 123 of the Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure; see also supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of articles 122 and 123 and the Markzannes case. 
77. See Respondent's Brief at *47A, Miller (No. 89-25877). 
78. 371 So. 2d 807 (La. 1979). See supra note 59 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Lavergne case. 
79. 485 So. 2d 565, 566 (La. Ct. App.). 
80. 545 So. 2d 537, 537 (La. 1989) (per curiam). See supra notes 60-62 and ac­
companying text for a discussion of Markzannes. 
81. Respondent's Brief at *49A, Miller (No. 89-25877). The doctrine of forum 
non conveniens provides that a case can be filed in another jurisdiction. If this is not 
possible, then the originating court may not dismiss the case but, to the contrary, must 
adjudicate it. 
82. See Miller v. American Dredging Co., 580 So. 2d 1091 (La. Ct. App. 1991), 
rev'd, 595 So. 2d 615 (La. 1992), affd, 510 U.S. 443 (1994). 
83. Id. at 1092 (citing Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S.S. Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 178 
(5th Cir. 1990». In the latter case, a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of his case from 
federal district court in order to refile in Louisiana state court deprived the defendant 
of the legal defense of forum non conveniens, a defense which he would have had in 
federal court but which was not recognized in Louisiana state courts due to the passage 
of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 123. See Ikospentakis, 915 F.2d at 177-78. 
See supra note 11 for the text of Article 123. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of the voluntary dismissal. See Ikos­
pentakis, 915 F.2d at 180. 
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non conveniens law to maritime cases, whether brought in federal 
or state court.84 Miller argued that the court must abide by the 
provisions of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 123, Sec­
tion C, which forbids the application of forum non conveniens in 
maritime cases and by the holding of the Supreme Court of Louisi­
ana in the case of Markzannes v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc. 85 In 
Markzannes, the court held that "Louisiana courts may apply Loui­
siana procedural law. in causes of action brought in Louisiana 
courts."86 
The court of appeal disagreed with Miller's arguments. In­
stead, the court affirmed the trial court's reasoning that the Louisi­
ana "Supreme Court's per curiam holding in Markzannes was not 
binding, and maintained [American Dredging Company's] excep­
tion based on an application of federallaw."87 The court of appeal 
agreed with the trial court that there was no connection between 
the case and the state of Louisiana, other than the presence of 
American Dredging's agent for service of process, which was con­
sidered an inadequate basis for a suit in the state, and that therefore 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens would allow a dismissal of 
the case.88 
C. Supreme Court of Louisiana 
Miller applied for and was granted certiorari by the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana for the purpose of determining whether, in a 
maritime case brought in Louisiana state court, the federal doctrine 
of forum non conveniens must be applied or whether Louisiana 
state law barring the application of forum non conveniens was the 
governing law.89 The Supreme Court of Louisiana noted that had 
84. The Louisiana Court of Appeal quoted the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit in Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Chao, 817 F.2d 307, 324 (5th Cir. 
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988), which stated that: 
Under the federal uniformity doctrine state courts must apply the forum non 
conveniens rule of the general maritime law in any case brought before them 
by citizens of foreign lands over which the federal courts would have admiralty 
jurisdiction. State law inconsistent with that doctrine cannot be applied in a 
maritime defense [sic]. 
Miller, 580 So. 2d at 1092 (quoting Exxon, 817 F.2d at 324). 
85. 545 So. 2d 537 (La. 1989) (per curiam). 
86. Id. at 537 (construing Missouri ex rei. S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 
(1950». 
87. Miller, 580 So. 2d at 1093. 
88. See id. 
89. See Miller v. American Dredging Co., 595 So. 2d 615, 616 (La. 1992), affd, 
510 U.S. 443 (1994). 
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this case been brought in federal court, there would be no issue of 
forum non conveniens because, pursuant to the United States 
Code,90 a federal court has the ability to simply transfer a case to 
another federal court where it might have been brought originally. 
A Louisiana state court has no similar ability. Thus, the only option 
available to a state court is dismissal under forum non conveniens.91 
After a discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as 
adopted by thirty-two states and the District of Columbia by 1992,92 
the court noted that "[b]y contrast, Louisiana courts have refused 
to apply the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, finding 
it 'foreign to our jurisprudence. "'93 The passage of Article 123 of 
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, disallowing the application 
of forum non conveniens to Jones Act or maritime claims,94 fol­
lowed the decision in Trahan v. Phoenix Insurance Co. that forum 
non conveniens was disallowed by Louisiana law.95 The court con­
cluded that "Louisiana courts may not dismiss cases for forum non 
conveniens except as provided in [Article 123],"96 thus concluding 
in the same manner it had in the Markzannes case that the doctrine 
cannot be applied in a Jones Act or maritime law case.97 
Substantive maritime law is applied to in personam admiralty 
cases in either state or federal court, according to the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana.98 The court claimed that since a state court has 
concurrent jurisdiction with a federal court as to in personam 
claims, the former has the right to "adopt such remedies, and to 
attach to them such incidents as it sees fit so long as it does .not 
attempt to make changes in the substantive maritime law."99 Thus, 
the court inquired whether the doctrine affects the substantive mar­
itime law.lOO If so, then the prohibition on its application in mari­
time cases under Article 123 would be preempted by the federal 
90. See supra note 42 for the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994). 
91. See Miller, 595 So. 2d at 616 n.5. 
92. See id. at 616. 
93. Id. at 617 (quoting Trahan v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 200 So. 2d 118, 121 (La. Ct. 
App. 1967». 
94. See supra note 11 for the text of Article 123. 
95. See 200 So. 2d 118 (La. Ct. App. 1967), superseded by statute, LA. CODE CIv. 
PROC. ANN. art. 123 (West Supp. 1996). See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Trahan. 
96. Miller, 595 So. 2d at 617 (citing Fox v. Board of Supervisors, 576 So. 2d 978 
(La. 1991». 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. Id. at 617-18. 
100. See id. at 618. 
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doctrine.WI 
Since the United States Supreme Court had not discussed fo­
rum non conveniens in a Jones Act or admiralty case at the time the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana heard this case, the court analogized 
the United States Supreme Court's treatment of forum non con­
veniens in a Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") case,I02 
Missouri ex reI. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield. lo3 In Mayfield, 
which originated in Missouri, the Supreme Court held that a state 
"should be freed to decide the availability of the principle of forum 
non conveniens in [FELA] suits according to its own locallaw."I04 
Citing various United States Supreme Court and courts of ap­
peals cases that involved federal courts sitting in diversity, the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana noted that the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is a procedural law that allows federal courts to manage 
their caseloads. lo5 In the same way, the court stated, Louisiana 
courts want to control their caseloads, and the Louisiana legislature 
decided to effect that desire by disallowing the application of the 
doctrine in Jones Act or maritime cases.1°6 The court reasoned 
that, in nearly all cases, the use of the Louisiana rule would not be 
outcome-determinative because the substantive law applied in the 
case is maritime law, which is consistent from state to state.1°7 The 
Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that "forum non conveniens 
is not a substantive feature of the general maritime law. Accord­
ingly, ... application of Louisiana's forum non conveniens rule is 
not preempted by federal admiralty law."108 The judgment of the 
lower court was reversed and the case remanded for further pro­
ceedings.109 American Dredging then filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and the writ was 
granted.1lo 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
103. 340 U.S. 1,4-5 (1950). The incorporation of the standards of FELA by the 
Jones Act was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Garrett v. Moore-McCor­
mack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 244 (1942). 
104. Mayfield, 340 U.S. at 5. 
105. See Miller, 595 So. 2d at 618. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 619. 
108. Id. 
109. See id. 
110. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 507 U.S. 1028 (1993). 
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D. 	 United States Supreme Court's Holding in American 
Dredging Co. v. Miller111 
The question presented to the United States Supreme Court 
was "whether, in admiralty cases filed in a state court under the 
Jones Act, 46 U.S.c. app. § 688, and the 'saving to suitors clause,' 
28 U.S.c. § 1333(1), federal law preempts state law regarding the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens."1l2 
1. Majority Opinion 
The Court began its analysis by citing the provlSlons in the 
Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the United States 
Code, all of which combined to give the federal courts the power to 
adjudicate maritime cases.113 The court reasoned that federal 
courts have exclusive in rem jurisdiction114 over admiralty cases; 
they do not share in rem jurisdiction with state courts when the 
cause of action is maritime. On the other hand, a state court can 
exercise in personam jurisdiction over an admiralty case, and under 
such circumstances may "'adopt such remedies, and ... attach to 
them such incidents, as it sees fit' so long as it does not attempt to 
make changes in the 'substantive maritime law."'115 The Court 
noted that the substantive law is altered when a state's remedy 
either changes a characteristic feature of maritime law or interferes 
with its uniformity.116 Thus, the first issue the Court considered 
111. 	 510 u.s. 443 (1994). 
112. Id. at 445. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. See id. at 
444. Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 457 (Souter, J., concurring). 
Justice Stevens filed an opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. See 
id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which 
Justice Thomas joined. See id. at 462 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
113. See supra note 16 for the text of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also supra 
note 2 for the text of 28 U.S.c. § 1333(1) (1994). The Miller majority quoted the Judici­
ary Act of 1789, which provided: 
That the district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several 
States ... exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction ... within their respective districts as well as upon the 
high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, 
where the common law is competent to give it. 
Miller, 510 U.S. at 446 (quoting the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 
(1789» (alterations in original). 
114. 	 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
115. Miller, 510 U.S. at 447 (quoting Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 
346 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) (quoting Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 
124 (1924») (alteration in original). 
116. 	 See id. (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917». 
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was whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens caused either of 
those events to occur.117 
After a background exploration of the source of forum non 
conveniens,118 the Court concluded that the doctrine "neither 
originated in admiralty nor has exclusive application there. To the 
contrary, it has long been a doctrine of general application."119 
Since the doctrine is not peculiar to maritime law, the Court held 
that Louisiana's refusal to apply the doctrine in a maritime case in 
state court did not produce" 'material prejudice to [ a] characteristic 
featur[e] of the general maritime law,'" and must therefore be 
allowed.120 
The second issue the Court considered was whether Louisi­
ana's refusal to apply forum non conveniens in maritime cases in 
state court" 'interfererd] with the proper harmony and uniformity' 
of maritime law."121 Earlier cases decided by the Supreme Court 
strongly supported the concept of uniformity in the application of 
maritime law.122 The Miller Court noted that uniformity was far 
from absolute, since decisions were made in other cases that went 
against a uniform application of law, yet were judged not to 
threaten the harmony of maritime law.u3 The Court decided it did 
not have to grapple with such inconsistent applications, since it per­
ceived forum non conveniens as a law of procedure, not of 
substance.124 
117. Changes in the maritime law could occur if the "state remedy 'works mate­
rial prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes 
with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate 
relations.'" Id. (quoting Jensen, 244 u.s. at 216). 
118. See id. at 447-49. See supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text for the back­
ground of forum non conveniens. 
119. Miller, 510 U.S. at 450. 
120. Id. (quoting Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216) (alterations in original). 
121. Id. at 451 (quoting Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216). 
122. See, e.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (striking 
down a state statute permitting a maritime plaintiff to recover damages under state 
workmen's compensation because such independent actions by states would destroy the 
harmony and uniformity intended by the Constitution in granting maritime rulemaking 
power to Congress and not to the individual states); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 
558, 566, 575 (1874) (holding that maritime law was to be applied uniformly throughout 
the United States since the Constitution was aimed at consistency and uniformity of 
commercial intercourse). 
123. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 452 (citing Romero v. International Terminal Operat­
ing Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373-74 (1959) (describing maritime cases where state remedies 
and state statutes were allowed to be applied in admiralty cases, such as those regarding 
liens, wrongful death, partition, and sales of ships, and breach of warranty in maritime 
insurance contracts)). 
124. See id. at 453. 
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In explanation of the latter point, the Court described the doc­
trine as "nothing more or less than a supervening venue provi­
sion,"125 and as such it has no influence on the manner in which 
persons conduct their affairs nor on persons' rights to have substan­
tive maritime law applied.126 Since the doctrine is applied at the 
discretion of the trial court based on a multiplicity of factors,127 
each case will be unique, and the Court declined to apply a strict 
standard for use in every case.ns The resultant lack of uniformity 
in the doctrine's application was acceptable to the Court.129 
However, the Court stated that maritime federal common law 
should harmonize with congressional enactments, particularly the 
Jones Act.130 Since the Jones Act incorporates by reference the 
remedies available to railway employees, the Court held that the 
Act "adopts 'the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability' 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)."131 Thus, 
state courts must adopt FELA's requirement to apply uniform fed­
eral substantive law.132 
The Court found support for its position in Missouri ex rei. 
Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield. 133 The Mayfield Court held that, 
when FELA was applied in a state court action, the state court 
could determine as a matter of local policy whether or not to allow 
the application of forum non conveniens.l34 The Court in Miller 
thereby concluded that since the Jones Act adopts FELA require­
ments and FELA allows state determination of applicability of fo­
rum non conveniens unrestrained by federal law, then Jones Act 
cases may use forum non conveniens or not, as each state may de­
cide.135 By analogy, the Court surmised that "maritime commerce 
in general does not require a uniform rule of forum non con­
125. Id. 
126. See id. at 454. 
127. See id. at 448-49 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 
(1947». For a description of the Gilbert factors, see supra note 41 and accompanying 
text. 
128. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 455-56.. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. at 455. See supra note 27 for the text of the Jones Act. 
131. Miller, 510 U.S. at 456 (quoting Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 
426,439 (1958) (citation omitted». See supra note 27 for the text of FELA, 45 U.S.c. 
§ 56 (1994). 
132. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 455-56 (construing Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 
317 U.S. 239,244 (1942». 
133. 340 U.S. 1 (1950). 
134. See id. at 4-5. 
135. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 456. 
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veniens."136 On the other hand, the Court emphasized the impor­
tance of harmony in the application of forum non conveniens in 
Jones Act as well as maritime cases,137 It often happens that an 
injured seaman combines a claim for tort damages under the Jones 
Act with a claim for unseaworthiness, maintenance, and cure into 
one action under maritime law,138 In such a combined case, the 
harmony of forum non conveniens could be disturbed because the 
seaman could have one claim dismissed for forum non conveniens 
(under maritime law) but not the other claim (the Jones Act claim 
under state law prohibiting the application of forum non 
conveniens).139 
The Miller Court found further support for its holding in Bain­
bridge v. Merchants & Miners Transportation Co.140 In Bainbridge, 
the Court held that when a Jones Act case is brought in state court, 
state law should determine venue,141 Thus, the Court concluded in 
the Miller case that while forum non conveniens is applicable in 
federal courts, its application is not similarly required in state 
courtS.142 The Court noted that its decision was limited to the facts 
of the case, one of them being that both parties to the dispute were 
domestic, and thus the Court refused to make a broader holding 
extending the effect of their ruling to foreign litigants.143 
2. Concurring Opinions 
Justice Souter, joining in the majority opinion and filing a sepa­
rate concurring opinion, noted that there may be cases where the 
line between the substantive and the procedural is difficult to estab­
lish. l44 He emphasized that in such cases, "how a given rule is char­
acterized for purposes of determining whether federal maritime law 
pre-empts state law will turn on whether the state rule unduly inter­
feres with the federal interest in maintaining the free flow of mari­
136. Id. 
137. See id. at 456-57. 
138. See id. at 457. 
139. See id. The Court stated that "harmonization of general admiralty law [re­
ferring to the unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims filed by seamen] with 
congressional enactments [referring to the Jones Act claims filed by seamen] would 
have little meaning if we were to hold that, though forum non conveniens is a local 
matter for purposes of the Jones Act, it is nevertheless a matter of global concern re­
quiring uniformity under general maritime law." Id. at 456-57. 
140. 287 U.S. 278 (1932). 
141. See id. at 280-81. 
142. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 457. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 457-58 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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time commerce. "145 
Justice Stevens, who concurred in the judgment and in the final 
section, Part II.C of the majority opinion, attacked as "untrustwor­
thy" the 1917 majority decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,146 
which held that the Court may "forbid state tribunals from applying 
state laws in admiralty cases."147 Justice Stevens claimed that Jen­
sen and the cases that followed, Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart148 
and Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co.,149 allowed state laws, even 
those approved by congressional acts, to be improperly eliminated 
or restricted by court action.150 Noting that Congress has not legis­
lated on the applicability of forum non conveniens in maritime 
cases brought in state courts, Justice Stevens concluded that until 
that time comes, "we should not lightly conclude that the federal 
law of the sea trumps a duly enacted state statute. "151 Justice Ste­
vens could see no danger to maritime commerce from the differ­
ences among states in the application of forum non conveniens. He 
asserted that protection is afforded by other means152 without 
resorting to reliance on "Jensen's special maritime pre-emption 
doctrine and its abstract standards of 'proper harmony' and 'charac­
teristic features. "'153 
145. Id. 
146. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
147. Miller, 510 U.S. at 458-59 (Stevens, J., concurring) (construing Southern Pa­
cific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917». In Jensen, a railroad worker was killed while 
unloading a ship. See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 207-08. The New York courts affirmed the 
damage award made to Jensen's family by the Workmen's Compensation Commission 
of New York, see id. at 209-10, but the United States Supreme Court struck down the 
award. See id. at 212, 218. The Court held that the Compensation Statute gave the 
plaintiff an award based on the injury the workman received and not based on fault, 
which was a remedy unknown to the common law and thus not a remedy intended to be 
saved to suitors as an exception to the jurisdiction of federal courts over maritime cases. 
See id. at 218. The Court held that state legislation could not preempt federal legisla­
tion if it offended a "characteristic feature" of maritime law, or if it interfered with the 
"harmony and uniformity" of maritime law. Id. at 216. 
148. 253 U.S. 149 (1920). 
149. 264 U.S. 219 (1924). 
150. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 459 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated 
that "Jensen and its progeny represent an unwarranted assertion of judicial authority to 
strike down or confine state legislation--even state legislation approved by Act of Con­
gress-without any firm grounding in constitutional text or principle." Id. Justice Ste­
vens complained that state-passed laws, such as workmen's compensation laws, could 
be declared inapplicable in cases that came under admiralty jurisdiction and that even 
Congress could not override the admiralty law. See id. 
151. Id. at 461. 
152. See id. at 461-62 (citing the Commerce and the Due Process clauses of the 
U.S. Constitution as the other means that afford protection to maritime litigants). 
153. Id. at 461. 
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3. Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the conclusions drawn by the 
majority from the history of forum non conveniens and Supreme 
Court precedents. The majority had rejected the need for "uni­
formity and the elimination of unfair forum selection rules" in de­
termining whether to apply forum non conveniens to maritime 
cases in state courts.154 While Justice Kennedy conceded that state 
courts can exercise discretion in hearing maritime cases, he ob­
jected to state courts' ability to reject the use of forum non con­
veniens in all cases. 155 According to Justice Kennedy, the Court's 
holding thus "condone[ d] the forum shopping and disuniformity 
that the admiralty jurisdiction is supposed to prevent. "156 In addi­
tion, Louisiana's rule is damaging to friendly relations among states 
and nations by disallowing the application of the doctrine in any 
maritime cases brought in Louisiana state courts, thus impeding 
maritime trade.157 
Justice Kennedy cited various cases to demonstrate how the 
dismissal of cases for an inconvenient forum has a positive effect on 
the United States' trading relations with other nations.158 Justice 
Kennedy concluded that "forum non conveniens is an established 
feature of the general maritime law,"159 and it is confusing and dis­
ruptive of maritime trade when Louisiana state courts· apply a dif­
ferent rule.160 While Miller involved an American seaman and an 
American defendant, Justice Kennedy indicated that the issue of 
forum non conveniens should be resolved in a manner applicable 
beyond the specific facts of Miller .161 Justice Kennedy concluded 
that American Dredging deserved a "principled ruling on its objec­
tion,"162 and asserted that the discretionary aspect of the doctrine 
154. Id. at 462 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
155. See id. 
156. Id. at 463. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 464-68. 
159. [d. at 466. 
160. See id. at 466-67. 
161. See id. at 470. Similarly, a recent law review article bemoaned the fact that 
the Miller Court had not analyzed the forum non conveniens doctrine in terms of its 
purpose, thus leaving unresolved the question as to whether the Court's holding applied 
to foreign as well as domestic (American) maritime litigants. See Julie C. Ashby, Note, 
Hung Out to Dry, But Still Dripping Wet: The United States Supreme Court Docks Fo­
rum Non Conveniens in Miller v. American Dredging Co., 18 TuL. MAR. L.J. 347, 358 
(1994). 
162. Miller, 510 U.S. at 470 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Though it may be doubt­
ful that a forum non conveniens objection will succeed when all parties are domestic, 
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was "a virtue, not a vice."163 
III. ANALYSIS 
State and federal cases involving the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens illustrate the various and often conflicting interpreta­
tions given to the doctrine by the courts. From the beginning of 
American jurisprudence, courts have treated maritime cases differ­
ently from non-maritime cases.164 Similarly, forum non conveniens 
has been treated differently from other procedural rules.165 A mar­
itime case brought in federal court follows substantive maritime law 
and federal procedures. A maritime case brought in state court 
generally follows substantive maritime law. However, in American 
Dredging Co. v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that state courts 
may nonetheless apply their own procedural rules, including the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.l66 Miller held that application 
of Louisiana's forum non conveniens rule in a maritime case was 
allowed for two reasons: (1) forum non conveniens was not consid­
ered a "characteristic feature" of maritime law, that is, exclusively 
applied in maritime law, and (2) the application of Louisiana's fo­
rum non conveniens doctrine did not cause harm to the uniformity 
or harmony of maritime law.167 
The majority's holding requires that, in order to be characteris­
tic of maritime law, the procedure of forum non conveniens must be 
applied only in maritime law. The doctrine has little chance of ful­
filling that requirement. Indeed, it would be difficult for any proce­
dural rule to be limited in its application to one type of law: After 
the Court created its own definition of "characteristic," it concluded 
that forum non conveniens was not characteristic of maritime law. 
As a result, the Court could not require the application of federal 
forum non conveniens in a maritime case brought in state court if 
the latter wished not to apply the doctrine. l68 Louisiana could thus 
apply its own forum non conveniens procedures, even though they 
conflicted with federal procedures. In addition, the majority 
that conclusion should ensue from a reasoned consideration of all the relevant circum­
stances, including comity and trade concerns." Id. at 469. 
163. Id. 
164. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Constitu­
tion's grant of judicial power in admiralty and maritime cases. 
165. See supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text for the history of the forum 
non conveniens doctrine. 
166. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 453. 
167. See id. at 447. 
168. See id. at 450. 
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claimed that permitting Louisiana to employ its own version of fo­
rum non conveniens did not disrupt the uniformity of federal mari­
time law. The majority's manipulation of a definition to justify 
Louisiana's preemption of federal forum non conveniens is an inad­
equate solution to the problem presented. 
A more appropriate solution regarding the application of fo­
rum non conveniens is the perspective suggested by Justice Ken­
nedy's dissent in Miller.169 Justice Kennedy argued that "forum 
non conveniens is an established feature of the general maritime 
law."170 The Miller majority, he argued, was incorrect in defining 
"established feature" as one which necessarily originated in admi­
ralty or was peculiar to admiralty.l7l Instead, the Court should 
have focused on "whether [forum non conveniens] is an important 
feature of the uniformity and harmony to which admiralty as­
pires."l72 Had the Court done so, it would have concluded that the 
doctrine is vital for preserving harmony in maritime trade and 
preventing an American state, such as Louisiana, from denying a 
defendant the forum non conveniens defense,173 which would result 
in the "forum shopping and disuniformity" that uniform maritime 
law is intended to avoid,174 
A. Supreme Court Majority in Miller "Misses the Boat" 
1. The "Characteristic" Test is Overly Restrictive 
In analyzing whether forum non conveniens was a characteris­
tic feature of maritime law, the Miller Court found that, while fo­
rum non conveniens originated in Scottish estate cases and was 
applied in many early maritime cases, the doctrine has not been 
exclusive to maritime law,17s In Miller, the Court established the 
standard that, in order for a procedural feature to be characteristic 
of maritime law and thus governed by federal maritime law, the 
feature had to be exclusively applied in maritime law,176 Since fo­
169. See id. at 462-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
170. Id. at 466. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 463. 
173. See id. at 467. 
174. Id. at 463. 
175. See id. at 449. 
176. See id. at 450. The majority used the proviso, as stated in Jensen, that when a 
state exercises in personam jurisdiction, it may not apply any remedy that "works mate­
rial prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes 
with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate 
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rum non conveniens was applied in non-maritime177 as well as mari­
time cases,118 the Miller Court concluded that forum non 
conveniens was not an exclusive feature characteristic of maritime 
law.179 
This conclusion raises the question of whether there would be 
any rule that could possibly satisfy the Court's test of "characteris­
tic." It is doubtful that any procedure would be solely applied in a 
maritime context and nowhere else. The fact that the Court chose 
to apply the exclusivity definition in the case of forum non con­
veniens suggests that the Court was less interested in enforcing the 
application of a doctrine routinely applied in maritime law and 
more interested in finding a reason to justify Louisiana's applica­
tion of state procedure in a maritime case brought in its state 
courts. 
The Miller Court's interpretation of the characteristic-feature 
test is an overly narrow one, considering the traditional, widespread 
application of forum non conveniens in maritime cases.180 Even the 
relations." Id. at 447 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,216 (1917». 
For a discussion of the Jensen case, see supra note 147. 
177. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (indicating that in 
a case for damages from an airplane crash, the denial of forum non conveniens was not 
permitted because the law of the country to which the case was moved was less advan­
tageous); Missouri ex reL S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (reversing the lower 
court's denial of forum non conveniens in an accident case because the only reason for 
the denial was that the lower court incorrectly believed they were required to reject the 
forum non conveniens defense in Federal Employers' Liability Act cases); Koster v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) (holding that a stockholder's deriva­
tive suit filed in the plaintiffs home state of New York was properly dismissed by the 
district court applying forum non conveniens because it was more convenient for the 
company to hold the trial in Illinois and the plaintiff was not inconvenienced by the 
change);· Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (holding that, in a civil lawsuit 
involving damages from a fire that occurred in Virginia, the court in New York, where 
the suit was filed, did not abuse its discretion in applying forum non conveniens and 
dismissing the case to a more appropriate forum, Virginia, because that is one of many 
factors that are balanced by courts in deciding whether or not to apply the doctrine). 
178. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988) (affirming 
the right of defendant to present its argument in Texas state court that federal maritime 
forum non conveniens law preempts the Texas constitutional statute allowing "open 
courts" and thus the prohibition of forum non conveniens at the state court's discre­
tion); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S. Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932) (affirming the New 
York district court decision to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens because colli­
sion, while in American waters, involved only Canadian persons and Canadian-owned 
ships). 
179. See Miller, 510 U.S. 450 (1994). 
180. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for a description of early cases 
applying the forum non conveniens doctrine; see also The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 367 
(1885) (United States admiralty courts had proper jurisdiction dver cases between for­
eigners "unless special circumstances exist to show that justice would be better sub­
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dictionary definition of "characteristic," "belonging to or especially 
typical or distinctive of the character or essential nature Of,"181 does 
not indicate that the trait can only be found in a particular group or 
type. Simply because the doctrine happens to be characteristic of 
non-maritime law does not mean that it cannot also be accurately 
described as characteristic of maritime law. Certainly the applica­
tion of forum non conveniens in non-maritime cases does not pre­
clude its application in maritime cases or vice-versa. Thus, the 
"characteristic" test employed by the majority is too limiting and 
leads to perverse results. 
2. 	 Harmony and Uniformity in Maritime Law are 

Threatened by the Miller Decision 

The Court in Miller also evaluated whether the denial of forum 
non conveniens caused harm to the uniformity and harmony of 
maritime law. The Court began by recognizing not only the histori­
cal importance of uniformity in maritime law, citing Southern Pa­
cific Co. v. Jensen,182 but also the fact that absolute uniformity is 
not required.183 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that 
due to the "discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined with the 
multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application," referring 
to the factors enumerated by the Gilbert Court,184 the application 
of forum non conveniens makes "uniformity and predictability of 
outcome almost impossible."185 The Miller Court thus seemed to 
accept some amount of variation and lack of uniformity in the ap­
plication of the doctrine without regarding that situation as creating 
any harmful effects. 
In fact, the Court has tolerated disuniformity by permitting 
states to determine when to apply forum non conveniens. In Chick 
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,186 the Court held that as to Jones Act 
served by declining it"); The Maggie Hammond, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 435, 457 (1869) (in a 
case between two foreigners, the Court granted a forum non conveniens dismissal, not­
ing that courts have the discretion to do so if it would better serve justice); Mason v. 
The Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240, 264 (1804) (in a case between two foreign 
ships, the court of appeals in Maryland appropriately heard the case, even though the 
court had the ability to dismiss the case). See supra notes 34-36 and 37-38 and accom­
panying text for discussions of Mason and The Maggie Hammond, respectively. 
181. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 376 (3d ed. 1976). 
182. See supra note 147 for a discussion of Jensen. 
183. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 451 (citing The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 
575 (1874)). 
184. See supra note 40-41 and accompanying text discussing Gilbert. 
185. Miller, 510 U.S. at 455. 
186. 486 U.S. 140 (1988). 
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and maritime claims brought in state court, the state was competent 
to resolve the issue of whether or not to apply forum non con­
veniens and could permit state procedure to preempt federal proce­
dure. l87 At the same time, the Court admitted that federal 
maritime forum non conveniens determinations might preempt 
state determinations and that the defendants should be permitted 
to make that argument to the Texas state courts.188 In addition, 
Justice White noted in his concurrence in Chick Kam Choo that the 
uniformity in maritime law is so important that federal law may re­
quire that a case be dismissed for forum non conveniens even if it 
preempts a state court's forum non conveniens law.189 
When the Supreme Court of Missouri, as described in Missouri 
ex rei. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield,190 denied the forum non 
conveniens exception of the defendant in a FELA case, it reasoned 
that uniformity of federal law required such action.191 In reversing 
the decision, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that it 
did not mean to imply to the states that forum non conveniens was 
prohibited in FELA cases, but simply that FELA cases should be 
treated in a non-discriminatory manner,192 Thus, the Court held 
that forum non conveniens could be treated as a local procedure, so 
long as it is applied equally in all cases.193 
In Louisiana, forum non conveniens is not applied equally in 
all cases. The doctrine is prohibited only in maritime and Jones Act 
cases.194 Since the Jones Act incorporates FELA, by analogy there 
is discrimination against FELA cases brought under the Jones Act 
in Louisiana, which is specifically prohibited by the Court's holding 
in Mayfield. 195 Thus, in Louisiana, the doctrine of forum non con­
veniens is denied not only to Jones Act and maritime cases, but to 
FELA cases brought under the Jones Act as well. This result would 
187. See id. at 150. The Court noted that a majority of the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, in Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 324 (5th Cir. 1987), 
allowed a forum non conveniens dismissal to Singapore as a more appropriate forum 
than Texas because "[i]n this maritime context, ... the so-called 'reverse-Erie' uniform­
ity doctrine required that federal forum non conveniens determinations pre-empt state 
law." Id. at 145 (citation omitted). 
188. See Chick Kam Chao, 486 U.S. at 150. 
189. See id. at 151 (White, J., concurring). 
190. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mayfield. 
191. See Missouri ex rei. S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4 (1950). 
192. See id. 
193. 'See id. 
194. See supra note 11 for the text of LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 123(B),(C) 
(West Supp. 1996). 
195. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mayfield. 
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be unanticipated by those filing Jones Act FELA suits in Louisiana 
and could substantially affect the outcomes of such cases. The 
Court has noted numerous times that the application of forum non 
conveniens is discretionary on the part of the court applying the 
doctrine.196 Yet in permitting some states to prohibit the applica­
tion of the doctrine, the Court is fostering harmful disuniformity.197 
Predicting the outcome of a case is nearly impossible; but the 
ability to rely on the application of consistent rules is a reasonable 
expectation. The uniform application of forum non conveniens in 
maritime cases brought in either state or federal court would assure 
litigants of fair and consistent procedures accompanying the appli­
cation of uniform maritime substantive law. By not insisting on uni­
form procedures, the Miller Court has caused harm to the 
traditional uniformity and harmony of maritime law. 
3. Substantive Rights and Procedural Rules Collide in 
Miller 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins 198 established that state substan­
tive law and federal procedural rules would be applied to cases in 
federal court under diversity jurisdiction (the Erie doctrine).199 The 
purpose of the doctrine was to ensure that there would be no dis­
crimination against litigants who were not citizens of the state and 
that the same result would be obtained whether the case was filed 
in federal or state court.200 A type of reverse-Erie has been created 
in Miller, where federal substantive law and state procedures are 
applied in maritime cases brought in state court. In this instance, 
however, the application of the same substantive law, federal mari­
time law, in federal or state court, would not ensure uniformity of 
196. See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994); Chick 
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 150 (1988); Missouri ex rei. S. Ry. Co. v. 
Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 (1950); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). 
197. Permitting the several states to selectively apply the doctrine is inconsistent 
with long established precedent: 
One thing is ... unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a 
system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. 
It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of 
maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that 
would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution 
aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the 
States with each other or with foreign states. 
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (Wall.) 558, 575 (1874). 
198. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
199. See id. at 74-75. 
200. See id. 
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outcome regardless of forum because different state procedures are 
applied that affect the manner in which the substantive law is 
applied . 
. As noted, the Supreme Court cases involving forum non con­
veniens seem themselves to suffer from inconsistency.201 This lack 
of uniformity in the Court's decisions causes confusion among prac­
titioners.202 Even Justice Scalia could not delineate a test for uni­
formity, observing that "[ilt would be idle to pretend that the line 
separating permissible from impermissible state regulation is read­
ily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even en­
tirely consistent within our admiralty jurisprudence.''203 
The implication from Miller is that the forum non conveniens 
procedure does not affect maritime law in any manner that con­
cerns the Court, such as impacting the subStantive maritime law. 
The Miller Court in fact described the forum non conveniens doc­
trine as a matter of "judicial housekeeping" for federal courts,204 in 
much the same way that transfers among federal courts permit the 
allocation of cases for the convenience of the courts and parties.205 
The Court held that when a maritime case is filed in state court, the 
state should be allowed to apply its own local procedural rules.206 
Thus, a state court can disregard the federal procedure, as long as 
substantive maritime law is not affected. The assumption made by 
201. For example, although the Jensen Court held that state law could not inter­
fere with maritime law, the Chick Kam Chao Court pennitted state procedure to pre­
empt federal procedure. See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon, 486 U.S. 140, 150 (1988); 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 212 (1917); see also supra notes 147 and 186­
89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Jensen and Chick Kam Chao, respectively. 
Justice Souter, concurring in Miller, noted that in deciding whether federal mari­
time law preempts state law, a court will have to detennine "whether the state rule 
unduly interferes with the federal interest in maintaining the free How of maritime com­
merce." American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 457-58 (1994) (Souter, J., con­
curring). Justice Stevens, also concurring in Miller, was clear in his assessment of the 
Supreme Court's previous holdings on the subject, saying "[i]f thls Court's maritime 
pre-emption rulings can be arranged into any pattern, it is a most haphazard one." Id. 
at 460 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
202. Telephone Interview with James A. George, Co-counsel for William R. 
Miller, Sr. (Feb. 20, 1995). 
203. Miller, 510 U.S. at 452. 
204. Id. at 457. 
205. See supra note 42 and accompanying text for an explanation of federal 
transfers. 
206. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 447 (construing Madruga v. Superior Court of Califor­
nia, 346 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) (quoting Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 
109,124 (1924»). "[T]he State, having concurrent jurisdiction [with the federal courts], 
is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit." Red 
Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 124. 
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the Court is that a procedural rule does not affect the outcome of a 
maritime case. However, this has been shown not to be the case. 
For example, the Court in an earlier case actually required that 
a procedural rule be applied in preference to a conflicting state pro­
cedure, even though not characteristic of maritime law, because the 
litigant's substantive maritime rights would be affected. In the mar­
itime case of Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. ,207 brought in Penn­
sylvania state court, the Supreme Court held that the application of 
a procedural rule-specifically, allocation of the burden of proof­
was more than a mere housekeeping detail because it affected the 
seaman's substantive right to obtain relief.208 Pennsylvania treated 
the burden of proof of a seaman's release as a procedural rule, and 
imposed the burden on the plaintiff.209 The Supreme Court stated 
that the general admiralty rule required the party setting up the 
seaman's release to bear the burden of proof.210 Although burden 
of proof was not an exclusive characteristic of admiralty, the Court 
held that a state procedural rule, here the burden of proof, should 
not obstruct the uniform application of law in Jones Act cases 
brought in state court.211 Thus, the seaman was entitled to the full 
procedural, as well as substantive, protection of maritime law. 
The Garrett decision illustrates the Supreme Court holding 
that a conflicting state procedural rule that substantially affects a 
litigant's substantive rights can be preempted by a federal rule in a 
maritime case brought in state court.212 Based on Garrett, if Ameri­
can Dredging could have proven that its substantive maritime rights 
were in any way compromised, then the Miller Court should have 
insisted that Louisiana apply the forum non conveniens doctrine, 
despite the fact that Louisiana had a conflicting procedure. 
In a seemingly inconsistent decision, the Supreme Court, in 
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co. ,213 permitted the application of 
a state remedy-specific performance-that was not recognized by 
maritime law.214 Two parties had a written contract that provided 
207. 317 U.S. 239 (1942). 
208. See id. at 249. 
209. See id. at 242. 
210. See id. at 248. 
211. See id. at 249. "This Court has specifically held that the Jones Act is to have 
a uniform application throughout the country, unaffected by 'local views of common 
law rules.'" Id. at 244 (quoting Panama Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 392 (1924}). 
212. See id. at 249. 
213. 264 U.S. 109 (1924). 
214. See id. at 124. 
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for arbitration under the Arbitration Law of New York.215 The 
Red Cross Line had chartered a vessel from the Atlantic Fruit 
Company, but Atlantic refused to perform.216 When Atlantic re­
fused to participate in arbitration, Red Cross sought specific per­
formance of the contract as provided for by the Arbitration Law of 
New York.217 The lower state courts upheld the remedy, but the 
New York Court of Appeals reversed, stating that admiralty law 
controlled.218 The Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the trial 
court. The Court reasoned that New York's procedural law requir­
ing specific performance as the remedy, while not a remedy recog­
nized by maritime law, nevertheless did not affect or change 
substantive maritime law.219 Because maritime law permits the en­
forcement of arbitration agreements, the Court concluded that the 
New York Arbitration Law requiring enforcement did not change 
substantive maritime law.220 Since specific performance is not per­
mitted under maritime law, the plaintiff would have had no remedy 
in this maritime case. Yet the Court permitted specific performance 
to apply because it held that the substantive maritime law was not 
changed.221 Thus, the Court permitted a state procedure unknown 
to admiralty to be applied in a maritime case brought in state court 
in the interest of justice. In balancing the competing interests of a 
state in applying its own law in its own courts versus the interest in 
a uniform application of maritime law, the Red Cross Court showed 
a decided preference for the state interest, regardless of the effect 
on maritime law. 
Evidencing a similar preference, the Miller Court held that a 
state is not required to apply the forum non conveniens procedure 
in a maritime case brought in state court.222 Yet other Supreme 
Court decisions have forced a state to apply forum non conveniens, 
regardless of the substantive effect on the litigants. In some of 
these cases, the Court's decision as to the applicability of forum non 
conveniens could result in reduced damages for plaintiffs. For ex­
. 215. See id. at 118-19. The Arbitration Law of New York provided "that a provi­
. sion in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising be­
tween the parties 'shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'" Id. at 118. 
216. See id. at 119. 
217. See id. 
218. See id. at 119-20. 
219. See id. at 124. 
220. See id. 
221. See id. at 118-19. 
222. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1994). 
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ample, in the following two cases, the Supreme Court's dismissal on 
the grounds of forum non conveniens meant that the plaintiffs were 
subject to less generous law in the foreign forums than in the fo­
rums in which they originally filed.223 
In the first case, Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamship 
Ltd. ,224 the Court denied the plaintiffs a larger recovery by permit­
ting the defendant to use the forum non conveniens defense to re­
move the case from an American to a Canadian court.225 Thus, 
although the outcome was changed by the use of the forum non 
conveniens defense, maritime law was neither interfered with nor 
changed. In the second case, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno ,226 the 
Court confirmed the Paterson holding that the dismissal of a suit on 
the grounds of forum non conveniens "may not be barred solely 
because of the possibility of an unfavorable change in law."227 The 
Court concluded that it was more important to maintain the integ­
rity of maritime law and the proper application of the procedural 
rule of forum non conveniens than to permit the choice of forum to 
be based solely on the outcome for the litigants.228 
Thus, the Supreme Court has insisted on the application of a 
maritime procedural rule in cases where the Court determines that 
the substantive rights of the litigant may be affected, as in Garrett v. 
Moore-McCormack CO.229 Yet the Court has also insisted on the 
application of a maritime procedural rule where the substantive 
rights of the litigants are less important than ensuring the uniform 
223. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 240, 249-50 (1981); Canada 
Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S. Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 418 (1932). 
224. 285 U.S. 413 (1932). 
225. See id. at 418. 
226. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
227. Id. at 248-49. The Court further explained the importance of forum non 
conveniens by the following: 
In fact, if conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of 
a change in law. the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtually 
useless. Jurisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied. As a 
result, many plaintiffs are able to choose from among several forums. Ordina­
rily, these plaintiffs will select that forum whose choice-of-Iaw rules are most 
advantageous. Thus, if the possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive 
law is given substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry, dismissal 
would rarely be proper. 
Id. at 250. 
228. See id. at 251-52. 
229. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). See supra notes 
207-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Garrett. 
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applicability of maritime procedural rules, as in Paterson230 and 
Piper Aircraft.231 These conflicting interpretations by the Supreme 
Court make it difficult for lower courts to ascertain the correct stan­
dard for applying procedural rules in maritime cases brought in 
.state courts. Since the Court has not clearly articulated a standard 
with reasonable parameters, lower courts are left to their own inter­
pretations or to the latest pronouncement of the Court. This is not 
a satisfactory state of affairs. 
A recent example of the confusion among courts can be found 
in Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish,232 which was heard by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Ballard 
cited American Dredging Co. v. Miller for the proposition that a 
state regulation is not invalidated by a federal regulation as long as 
the state regulation is procedural rather than substantive.233 In Bal­
lard, an oil tanker owned by the defendant ran aground in Narra­
gansett Bay, Rhode Island, spilling over 300,000 gallons of heating 
oil into the bay, causing the closing of the bay to shellfishing activi­
ties for two weeks.234 The captain and the owner of the vessel were 
convicted of violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
and fined.235 When some individuals brought suit against the 
owner, Ballard, in Rhode Island, Ballard brought "a petition in ad­
miralty for limitation or exoneration from liability."236 In that ad­
miralty action, some shellfish dealers asserted claims of extreme 
economic losses during the two week clean-up period, alleging neg­
ligence under federal maritime law and Rhode Island common law 
and economic losses under the Rhode Island Environmental Injury 
Compensation Act.237 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' 
federal claims as well as their state claims, based on a Supreme 
Court holding that "compensation for economic losses standing 
230. See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S. Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932). See 
supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text discussing Paterson. 
231. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. 235. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying 
text discussing Piper Aircraft. 
232. 32 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1994). 
233. See id. at 628. 
234. See id. at 624. 
235. See id. The captain and owner of the ship were fined $30,500 and $500,000 
respectively. See id. In addition, the owner "agreed to pay $3.9 million in compensa­
tion for federal cleanup costs, $4.7 million for state cleanup costs and damage to natural 
resources, $500,000 of which was to be available to compensate individuals, and 
$550,000 to settle claims for lost wages by local fishermen." Id. 
236. Id. 
237. See id. 
308 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:275 
alone is unavailable in admiralty cases."238 Thus, the district court 
held that federal admiralty law, which disallowed recovery for eco­
nomic losses, preempted the Rhode Island law allowing such recov­
ery.239 The plaintiffs appealed.240 
The First Circuit, in assessing Supreme Court cases involving 
conflict of state laws with federal maritime law, referred to the 
Court's holding in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, which disallowed 
state preemption of federal maritime law if the latter suffered inter­
ference with its characteristic features or its harmony and uniform­
ity.241 However, the First Circuit also noted that later Supreme 
Court cases allowed state laws to preempt federal maritime law, 
citing American Dredging Co. v. Miller.242 Since Miller read "char­
acteristic" as only narrowly applying to a federal rule that 
originated in admiralty or has exclusive application in admiralty, 
the First Circuit held that because the denial of recovery for purely 
economic losses did not originate in admiralty, it was not character­
istic of admiralty and thus could be preempted by Rhode Island's 
conflicting state law which allowed recovery.243 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Ballard court accepted the very narrow definition 
that the Miller Court gave to "characteristic." 
As to "harmony" and "uniformity," the First Circuit noted that 
the Miller Court had not "articulate[ d] a definitive test," holding 
instead that "there is no preemption where the relevant state law is 
procedural rather than substantive."244 Since the Rhode Island law 
in question was substantive, and the First Circuit found that the 
Supreme Court decisions offered no single comprehensive test as to 
substantive law, but rather reflected a balancing of state and federal 
interests on a case-by-case basis, the Ballard court decided to apply 
a balancing test as to the relative burdens placed on the plaintiffs 
and defendants.245 Concluding that Rhode Island's interest in pro­
tecting the environment was more important than the federal need 
for harmony or uniformity, the First Circuit held the Rhode Island 
law constitutional and allowed the plaintiffs damages for purely 
238. Id. at 624-25 (construing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 u.s. 
303 (1927». 
239. See id. at 625. 
240. See id. 
241. See id. at 627 (construing Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 
(1917». 
242. See id. (citing American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 u.S. 443 (1994». 
243. See id. at 627-28. 
244. Id. at 628 (citing Miller, 510 U.S. at 453). 
245. See id. at 628-29. 
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economic losses, despite the fact that maritime law prohibits such 
recovery.246 
Thus, despite the fact that the Rhode Island law was contrary 
to federal law in allowing recovery for economic loss as a result of 
damage to natural resources, the court allowed Rhode Island law to 
preempt federal law.247 The reliance on Miller in Ballard to pre­
empt conflicting federal maritime law illustrates the danger inher­
ent in not insisting on a uniform application of maritime procedural 
as well as substantive law.248 Allowing state law to preempt sub­
stantive federal maritime law is even more dangerous than permit­
ting state procedures to preempt federal procedures, yet both seem 
to have resulted from the Miller decision. Such preemption begins 
to erode the very reason for the existence of federal maritime law: 
the consistent application of a standardized body of law in every 
state and federal court. 
B. Solution: Justice Kennedy Suggests a Realistic Compromise 
The regulation of maritime activities has historically been dif­
ferentiated from domestic law as being of special significance.249 
The special substantive maritime law is uniformly applied in both 
state and federal courts without controversy.250 Maritime cases 
brought in federal courts apply federal procedural rules.251 Yet 
there is currently no federal legislation on the role of the proce­
dural rule of forum non conveniens in maritime or Jones Act cases 
brought in state court. The Miller Court attempted to clarify this 
dilemma by holding that the procedural law which follows the sub­
stantive law when a case is brought in state court may be deter­
mined by states in whatever manner they choose. As a result of 
246. See id. at 631. 
247. See id. 
248. 1\\'0 recent articles conclude, in opposition to Miller, that permitting Louisi­
ana to operate as an open forum unfairly forces a maritime defendant to litigate in an 
inconvenient forum. See Thomas R. Anderson, American Dredging Co. v. Miller: 
Clouding the Waters of Maritime Litigation, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1519, 1536-37 (1996); Har­
ris L. Kay, Note, Torpedoing the Uniformity of Maritime Law: American Dredging v. 
Miller, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1405, 1423-25 (1994). Another author acknowledges the 
problems inherent in establishing a single rule of forum non conveniens, but agrees with 
the Miller Court that such a rule would not strengthen maritime uniformity. See Lou­
Anne Milliman, Recent Development, American Dredging Co. v. Miller: State Law of 
Forum Non Conveniens Applies in Savings to Suitors Cases, 69 TUL. L. REV. 247, 256­
59 (1994). 
249. See supra Part LA. 
250. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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that holding, state procedural rules may be applied over conflicting 
federal procedural rules in maritime cases in state court. Such a 
holding, however, would seem to go against the attempt to keep 
maritime law consistent from state to state, and to avoid the forum 
shopping and disuniformity that maritime law was intended to 
eliminate.252 
Justice Stevens endorsed the majority's view in his concurring 
opinion in Miller.253 Nonetheless, he implied that Congress should 
consider definitively resolving this dilemma by legislation.254 In the 
meantime, however, such a solution would continue to unfairly pe­
nalize defendants brought into court in states such as Louisiana that 
prohibit application of forum non conveniens.in any maritime case. 
A somewhat different solution, advanced by Justice Souter, 
who concurred in Miller, is that whether the federal rule is allowed 
to preempt the state rule should depend on whether the state rule 
interferes with maritime commerce.255 Since a preliminary, factual 
evaluation would need to be made to determine whether maritime 
commerce has been interfered with, this solution may lead to 
greater expenditures of time and money on that one issue than are 
warranted. On the other hand, such a solution might allow occa­
sional applications of forum non conveniens where it is not now 
permitted. 
Justice Kennedy suggested the most reasonable solution. He 
favored the application of forum non conveniens as a fair and flexi­
ble doctrine that would have a positive effect on foreign trade as 
well as on domestic cases.256 In Justice Kennedy's view, forum non 
conveniens is an established feature of maritime law which should 
be applied uniformly by the states.257 He does not seem to think 
that forum non conveniens must have originated or been applied 
exclusively in maritime law in order to be understood as "character­
istic" of maritime law. Justice Kennedy's broader definition of 
"characteristic" promotes rather than limits the uniformity of mari­
time law. Thus, he seems to support the holding of the Jensen 
252. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,462 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). . 
253. See id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
254. See id. at 460-61. 
255. See id. at 457-58 (Souter, J., concurring). 
256. See id. at 463-67 (Kennedy, 1., dissenting). Justice Kennedy complained that 
"Louisiana's open forum policy obstructs maritime commerce and runs the additional 
risk of impairing relations among the states and with our foreign trading partners." Id. 
at 467. 
257. See id. 
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Court that disapproved of any state remedy that would prejudice a 
characteristic feature of maritime law or would interfere with the 
harmony and uniformity of maritime law.258 Justice Kennedy 
would require that forum non conveniens be an established feature, 
that is, used regularly in maritime law, rather than require that the 
doctrine be used exclusively in maritime law, as is required by the 
majority. Justice Kennedy's view promotes a policy of uniform ap­
plication of maritime law, of which all members of the Court 
approve.259 . . 
Another resolution for the dilemma, implied by Justice Ste­
vens, may be action by Congress.260 Congress should establish the 
standard that some federal procedures are essential to do justice in 
maritime cases because such provisions assure that fair and uniform 
procedures are applied to maritime cases whether brought in fed­
eral or state court. The doctrine of forum non conveniens should 
be included as one of those procedures. Such a solution would not 
create confusion concerning the applicability of certain procedures, 
such as forum non conveniens, and would not prejudice any defend­
ant due to the particular forum chosen by the plaintiff. In addition, 
the fair and uniform application of maritime substantive law is as­
sured when procedural rules that may be outcome-determinative 
are applied in an identical manner in every court in which a mari­
time case is brought. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal judiciary applies maritime substantive law and fed­
eral procedural rules in maritime and Jones Act cases. Under 
Miller, the state courts, while required to apply maritime substan­
tive law, are free to apply their own local procedural law, including 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Far from being a matter of 
federal court housekeeping, the doctrine can have a substantial ef­
fect on whether justice is done in maritime cases. For that reason, 
the Miller Court erred by ruling that Louisiana's procedural denial 
of the doctrine to a maritime defendant can preempt procedures 
applied in federal court, which allow the application of the doctrine 
at the discretion of the court. Because the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have rendered conflicting interpretations as to the ap­
propriate application of forum non conveniens, that doctrine should 
258. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). 
259. See supra Part II.D.l for the Miller majority view. 
260. See Miller, 510 U.S. at 460-61 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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be a federal procedure that is applied uniformly in maritime and 
Jones Act cases in both federal and state courts. Furthermore, 
states should be barred from applying a conflicting rule. The 
Supreme Court should abandon the exclusive application require­
ment for forum non conveniens and adopt Justice Kennedy's "es­
tablished feature of maritime law" as a benchmark for application 
of forum non conveniens in maritime cases brought in state courts. 
This solution would foster just decisions in maritime and Jones Act 
cases brought in state as well as federal courts. 
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